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Abstract
The Chinese Stock market had a special feature up to 2001 in that the stocks
trading was segmented according to the type of investor (domestic and foreign).
Since companies can issue both A shares (for domestic residents) and B shares
(foreign investors) and the legal status of these shares are the same, they would
be expected to have similar fundamental expected dividend flows. If discount rates
are fixed this should imply that the share prices will be cointegrated. We test this
proposition and find that there is no evidence for a long-run relationship for the
time period under investigation. Then we show there are two structural breaks,
corresponding to the regulatory shift in 2001 and the Asian financial crisis. After
correcting for these structural breaks, we identify long run relationships and consider
reasons for why such a relationship exists. By doing so we are able to throw some
light on why there is a significant discount on B shares relative to the same share
traded in the A market.
Key words: Chinese stock market, Cointegration, Structure break, B
share discount;
JEL: G15, G12
1 Introduction
The stock market in China has a special feature in the sense that it is divided
according to the type of investor. Originally, the A share market is for domestic
Chinese residents and is denominated in Chinese RMB Yuan, whereas the
B share is for foreign investors, and denominated in US dollars. However in
February 2001 domestic investors were allowed to trade in the B share market.
A company can issue A shares as well as B share and they have the same legal
status. Of the approximately 1250 listed companies in the two exchanges, only
75 issued both A and B shares. A summary of key statistics relating to these
two types of shares of Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE thereafter) 1 is provided
in Table 1.
Table 1
Some basic statistics of A and B share in SSE
A share B share
Number of Listed companies 821 54
Total number of shares issued 4602.18 100.17
Number of non-institutional Investor accounts 37.41 0.9986
* Data source: Shanghai Stock Exchange, www.sse.com.cn, 2005; Number of
shares are in 100 millions, whereas number of investor accounts are in millions
Since companies issuing B shares normally also issue A shares, they should
have the same fundamental dividend flows and hence, assuming constant dis-
count rates, they should be prices at similar levels. However, empirical evidence
does not support this argument. A great deal of literatures has found that B
share prices are persistently discounted relative to A share prices.
Bailey (1994) provided evidence of price discounts on B shares relative to A
shares (see also Bergstrom and Tang (2001) for evidence on the size of the
discount). The Chinese case is special and hence requires particular explana-
tion, since in other countries the price discount is on the shares available to
local residents (see Bailey et al. (1999)). Whilst there have been arguments
based upon efficient market concepts there have also been suggestions that
the explanation is due to rational speculative trading or more irrational type
trading rules such as positive feedback.
Fernald and Rogers (2002) argue that the discount on B shares is due to
the fact that there are few domestic financial assets available in China. Ma
(1996) uses cross sectional method to study share prices data for 38 compa-
nies that have both A and B shares listed in two exchanges. He found that
1 Shanghai Stock Exchange established in Dec. 19, 1990. It has 831 listed com-
panies with total market capitalization around 2717 billions of RMB. Source:
www.sse.com.cn
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the differences between prices of A and B shares are correlated with investors’
attitudes toward risk. He also considered that regulatory changes might ex-
plain the variability of B shares’ discounts. Chui and Kwok (1998) found prior
price movements affect prices changes in A and B markets and the direction of
information flow is mainly from B share markets to A share markets. Sjoo and
Zhang (2000) argue that this relationship holds only for Shanghai stock ex-
change. Groenewold et al. (2001) explored weak and semi-strong efficiency for
both A and B shares traded on both exchanges for the period 1992-2001. They
find evidence of departures from weak efficiency in the form of predictability
or returns on the basis of their own past values, and also the predictability
from A to B returns in Shanghai but no cross causality in Shenzhen.
Eun et al. (2001) use the lower risk aversion of Chinese investors to explain the
premium prior to opening of the market. However Chen et al. (2001) use return
variance of A and B stocks to proxy for risk but do not find any relationship
between the A premium and this measure of risk. Eun et al. (2001) find that the
B share discount is (positively) related to the covariance between the return on
B shares and a world index and to the difference between global and Chinese
risk-free interest rates. However they do not find it negatively related to the
covariance between A share returns and the Chinese stock index, a result
supported by Fernald and Rogers (2002), who also find no relations between
the discount and the covariance identified by Eun et al. Chen et al. (2001)
propose a liquidity-based explanation and find that stocks with the greatest
differential in trading volume and turnover across the A and B market also
have the greatest premium of the price on the A market. Hence the price
premium on A shares represent higher trading costs in the B market.
A further idea is that domestic investors have more information than foreign
investors. Choe et al. (2001) consider the case of Korea and find that this may
apply to individual local investors but not local institutional investors. Apply-
ing this idea to the Chinese market it is clear that the B discount may reflect
such informational asymmetry since trading in the A market is dominated by
individual investors. Foreign investors with less information are unwilling to
pay the price for stocks which Chinese investors pay (see Chakravarty et al.
(1998). Chan et al. (2006) use spreads to determine the information asymme-
try and find that the adverse selection component is higher for A shares and
that the it becomes more significant for B shares after 2001. Chen et al. (2004)
argue that whilst the removal of the control in 2001 has negated the impact of
information asymmetry there still are significant discounts on B shares. Whilst
they can explain some of the discount with reference to risk and liquidity they
propose that behavioural factors (such as overconfidence) are also important.
Mei et al. (2005) argue that speculation in the A market is responsible for
the A-share premium. They link trading volume to overvaluation in the pres-
ence of limited arbitrage (short-sales constraints which certainly operate in
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the Chinese markets). The key is that given the lack of arbitrage, sales will be
prompted by over-optimistic traders. In a dynamic context this implies that
individuals will buy a stock because they believe they will be able to sell to
someone who values the asset more highly in the future. As a consequence
there is a deviation between the price and fundamental value of the share.
Furthermore as traders perceptions of future value are more dispersed the
overvaluation gets worse and there is more trading. Karolyi and Li (2003) also
find evidence to support the view that the share price difference represents
non-risk effects. Specifically they examine the response of the price difference
to the regulatory change in 2001 (which we also consider) and find that the
response of share prices to this effect varies. Specifically small capitalization
stocks (note that Chen et al. (2001) observe that asymmetric information prob-
lems will be less significant for large firms) and those with momentum appear
to be most affected with the price differential falling substantially. Therefore
they do not find differential risk exposure, trading volume or liquidity to be
important. They interpret their results as confirming asymmetric information
as being a key driver of the discount (in that after 2001 local investors with
information could enter the market). They argue that momentum stocks are
often riskier so the increase in price of such stocks in the B market could be
down to risk preferences of local investors.
This paper is not about the B share discount itself. It approaches the issue from
a different perspective which looks at whether there are long-run relationships
between the two share markets - in other words is the discount predictable.
We use cointegration to investigate this issue and do not find evidence for
this. We also consider the possibility of structural changes in this relationship
(as in Ma (1996)). Using the technique of Gregory and Hansen (1996) and
Bai and Perron (1998), we find two breaks over the period of our data. Apart
from the regulatory changes (see Ma (1996) for early discussion of the effect
of regulation on the Chinese stock market) the Asian financial crisis seems
to have played an important role in affecting A and B share relationship.
Furthermore we propose various explanations for our results, consistent with
earlier literature on the B share discount.
The organization of this paper is the follows: section 2 provides some analysis
of why the share prices may be cointegrated and section 3 discusses the empir-
ical techniques used; section 4 shows how we construct indices and statistical
features of our dataset; section 5 outlines results of the empirical analysis;
section 6 discusses the results and concludes.
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2 Modelling the share prices in A and B markets
We start with the basic idea that the two types of share issued by Chinese
companies should be valued according to the same underlying expected divi-
dend flow. This assumes that information asymmetry (in the long-run) is not
a major issue. It is not difficult to conjecture that whilst domestic investors
receive information more quickly it is hard to suppose that information diffu-
sion does not take place over time. Hence we do not rule out the information
asymmetry (and consequent adverse selection) as an explanation for the B
share discount.
Under constant discount rates it is straightforward to demonstrate (ruling
out bubble solutions) that the price of a share is the discounted value of its
expected dividend stream into the infinite future.
Pt =
∞∑
i=1
δiEtDt+i (1)
where Pt is the price of the share, δ is the discount rate, Et(·) is the expectation
operator conditional on information at time t and Dt+i is the dividend paid
at time t + i. Constructing an index of such shares we obtain
P It =
N∑
j=1
αj
∞∑
i=1
δiEtDt+i (2)
where j = 1, ..., N is the index for shares and αj is the weight given to the
share j. Applying this formula to both A and B shares and assuming that
discount rates are δA and δB and information in the two markets generate
expectations EAt and E
B
t in A and B markets respectively then:
PAt = P
B
t +
N∑
j=1
αj
∞∑
i=1
[
δiAE
A
t Dt+i − δ
i
BE
B
t Dt+i
]
(3)
Note that the B share discount can be the result of differences in the discount
rates (including the risk premium) or expectations, factors which have been
used by previous literature to explain the observation.
We can observe that the price indices in the two markets are cointegrated if
the discount rates and informational asymmetries are related in a constant
manner over time. Hence we can write
PAt = a0 + a1P
B
t + ηt (4)
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and a0 accounts for the different discount rates and expectations and a1 con-
trols for different base-dates for indices and for the possibility that the discount
on B shares is related predictably to the level of the index. The random error
ηt has the usual properties and represents measurement errors in expected
dividends in the two markets.
However there are major changes which have affected discount rates and ex-
pectations in the two markets. Firstly we would expect the Asian Financial
Crisis to have increased the risk premium for international investors to invest
in Asian (including Chinese) shares. Furthermore the events associated with
this crisis will have become part of the information set which investors use to
assess the fundamentals of shares. Similarly the change in regulation in 2001
which allowed domestic investors access to the B share market may well have
influenced the relationship between the two indices.
As an alternative to this fundamental explanation we can also provide one
more rooted in the behavioural finance tradition. Our basic model is that de-
veloped by DeLong et al. (1990) to which we refer as DSSW from now on.
Their model has an overlapping generations structure. However we prefer to
think of it as describing investors who use ‘narrow framing’. As discussed in
Barberis and Thaler (2005), the idea behind ‘narrow framing’ is that individu-
als may only think about certain aspects of the problem (referred to as ‘mental
accounting’) when making a decision. Thus for an investment decision individ-
uals may look at short-run returns rather than view asset holding in the long
term. They may ignore aspects of the decision, focusing only on the returns to
the investment portfolio rather than including other important aspects such
as their labour income. Hence the structure proposed by DSSW, where in-
dividuals only trade twice, selling once and buying once, can be viewed as
that investors plan over one time period only. Arbitrage is not feasible since
rational agents (professional fund managers) must adopt a similar short-term
time horizon to maintain their investor base. In reality arbitrage the inability
to short-sell severely limits arbitrage possibilities in the Chinese case.
The DSSWmodel assumes that individuals maximize an utility function which
is exponential in wealth, U(w) = −e−γw. We have two assets, a safe asset yield-
ing return R and a risky asset. There are two types of trader, smart traders
who know the true return on both assets is R, and noise traders who make
mistakes predicting returns such that they predict the return to the risky as-
set as R+ δ where δ is normally distributed with mean value δ∗ and variance
σ2. DSSW show under these assumptions and with the trading structure de-
scribed above that the prices of the risky asset (assuming the price of the safe
asset is normalized to one) is given by:
Pt = 1 +
θ(δt − δ
∗)
1 +R
+
θδ∗
R
−
2γθσ2
R(1 +R)2
(5)
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If we consider the risky asset as the share indices we have constructed then we
can apply 5 to these indices for the A and B market (PAt and P
B
t , respectively).
Since we do not impose the same value for the indices we need to allow for
different values for the case of no noise trading, which represented by constants
α and β for A index and B index respectively. Proportion of noise traders are
measured by the coefficient θ. Thus we have:
PAt = α +
θA(δ
A
t − δ
∗
A)
1 +R
+
θAδ
∗
A
R
−
2γθAσ
2
A
R(1 +R)2
(6)
PBt = β +
θB(δ
B
t − δ
∗
B)
1 +R
+
θBδ
∗
B
R
−
2γθBσ
2
B
R(1 +R)2
(7)
Transforming 7 we can obtain:
α
β
PBt = α +
α
β
[
θB(δ
B
t − δ
∗
B)
1 +R
+
θBδ
∗
B
R
−
2γθBσ
2
B
R(1 +R)2
]
(8)
Using equation 6 and 8 we can see that:
PAt =
α
β
PBt −
α
β
[
θB(δ
B
t − δ
∗
B)
1 +R
+
θBδ
∗
B
R
−
2γθBσ
2
B
R(1 +R)2
]
+
θA(δ
A
t − δ
∗
A)
1 +R
+
θAδ
∗
A
R
−
2γθAσ
2
A
R(1 +R)2
and since (δBt −δ
∗
B) and (δ
A
t −δ
∗
A) are random errors, we may write the equation
above as:
PAt = a1P
B
t + a2 + t (9)
where a1 =
α
β
represents the B share discount and a2 = −
α
β
[
θBδ
∗
B
R
−
2γθBσ
2
B
R(1+R)2
]
+
θAδ
∗
A
R
−
2γθAσ
2
A
R(1+R)2
is the level parameter.
We can therefore see that structural breaks (shift in the levels parameter) in
the long-run relation between the two share indices will occur for a number of
reasons:
• Changes in the proportion of noise traders in each market (θA, θB);
• Changes in the noise trader expectation in either market (δ∗A, δ
∗
B);
• Changes in the precision of noise traders estimates (σ2A, σ
2
B)
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• Changes in the return on the risky asset R given differences in noise trader
expectations, precision of the estimates, or in the proportion of noise trader
across the two markets;
and, although we have not specifically listed this, if risk aversion parameters
γ change differently for traders in the two markets then we would also find a
shift in the cointegrating relationship.
We have identified two candidate events which can explain the changes in
the long-run relationship. The first is the Asian financial crisis. We would
argue that this may well have influenced δ∗B for noise traders in the B share
market, potentially changed the proportion of noise traders, increased the
dispersion of noise trader estimates of return, and even influenced the excepted
(required) return on B shares relative to A shares (international investors will
demand a higher risk premium than domestic investors). For the second event
(dismantling of legal restrictions on domestic investors investing in B shares)
this should not have affected expectations of noise traders but may well have
caused the proportion of noise traders in the B share market to increase as
less sophisticated domestic investors now enter the B market.
We therefore find that the noise trader model can provide a framework to
explain why two share indices constructed on the same shares may not behave
the same in the long-run. We can also provide specific reasons for why we see
changes in the relationship but it is difficult to make a clear inference of the
causes for structural breaks for the case we are considering.
Hence, under either model of the A and B stock market we will want to
investigate not only cointegration across the two markets but also the existence
of structural breaks. We now turn to consider the methodology we use to
investigate this latter issue.
3 Empirical methodology
3.1 Residual based cointegration test with structural break
Gregory and Hansen (1996) considered the testing of cointegration while allow-
ing for possible structural breaks. Their method is a residual based technique.
They suggest three models: level shifts, level and trend shifts and regime shifts.
The statistics are designed to test the null of no cointegration against the al-
ternative of cointegration in the presence of a possible regime shift. The shift
point is assumed to be unknown and will be tested in the model.
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Gregory and Hansen (1996) use three statistics ADF ∗, Z∗α and Z
∗
t * to test
for stationarity of OLS residuals of a possible cointegrated system. For the
ADF test, we follow the procedure suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991),
to start from a large lag and test down form this. If the coefficient of the last
included lag is significant at 10% level, then we select it as this lag length;
otherwise we reduce the order by one. We continue this procedure until the
coefficient of the last included lag is significant. We calculate all ADF statistics
for every possible breaking point within the test period and the construct the
statistic:
ADF ∗ = inf ADF (τ) (10)
Z∗α = inf Zα(τ) (11)
Z∗t = inf Zt(τ) (12)
Gregory and Hansen provide relevant critical values for these test statistics in
the different models:
Model I, Standard cointegration
yt = µ1 + α1xt + t (13)
Model II. Cointegration with level shift (CC)
yt = µ1 + µ2DBt + α1xt + t (14)
Model III. Cointegration with level shift and trend (CT)
yt = µ1 + µ2DBt + α1xt ++βt + t (15)
Model IV. Cointegration with regime shift (CS)
yt = µ1 + µ2DBt + α1xt + α2xtDBt + t (16)
where the definition of dummy variable DB is that DBt = 1 if t > Tb and
zero otherwise. Tb is the breaking point.
3.2 Test for multiple breaks
Bai and Perron (1998) and Bai and Perron (2003) consider both theoretical
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implications and empirical applications of multiple structural breaks in lin-
ear models. The existence of multiple structural breaks is attractive especially
in long run time series analysis where different factors might affect the be-
haviour over the data period. Bai and Perron’s method is applicable under a
general framework of partial structural changes, which allows a subset of the
parameters not to change. It can be expressed in compact matrix form:
Y = Xβ + Zδ +U (17)
where Y = (y1, y2, ..., yt)
′,X = (x1, x2, ..., xt)
′,U = (u1, u2, ..., ut)
′,
δ = (δ1, ...δm+1)
′, and Z is the matrix the matrix which diagonally partitions
Z at (T1, T2, ....Tm), i.e. Z = diag(Z1,Z2, ...,Zm).
By minimizing the sum of squared residuals based on the least squares princi-
ple, we obtain the break point estimators as global minimum of the objective
function. Since testing for multiple breaks may generate a significant compu-
tational burden, Bai and Perron use an algorithm based on the principle of
dynamic programming. They also provide several ways to test and confirm the
number of breaks and discuss how to construct confidence intervals. In our es-
timation, since the series we use are nonstationary, most of the test statistics
proposed in Bai and Perron’s original paper are not available. However, Bai
and Perron’s technique can provide a consistent estimation of the number and
timing of possible breaks and thus the technique provides useful information
to our study here.
4 Data description and preliminary tests
We collect data from the Taiwan Economic Journal Asia Emerging Market
Data Base. In order to have similar underlying features for study of the A and
B share markets, we construct our own indices. Thirty stocks (See Table .1 in
the appendix for a full list of chosen stocks) are selected from the Shanghai
Stock Exchange, for companies that have both A and B shares issued over the
full sample period. We construct monthly equal valued and value weighted
indices. The full sample period is monthly, from January 1995 to April 2005,
giving 124 observations. The indices use January 1995 as base date. Note that
although the price reflects the different currency denomination, whereas the
B share is denominated in US dollars, we do not explicitly include this into
our data analysis. The reason is that due to foreign exchange policy in China
over our data period, the exchange rate between US dollars and RMB Yuan
is reasonably stable.
We present graphs of the two indices in figures 1 and 2 below. Note that we
are using indices and not prices. Direct observations from these diagrams of
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equal weighted and value weighted indices indicate that they are not likely
to exhibit a long run relation over the full sample. Instead it may be inferred
that there are two possible breakpoints around the 30th (June 1997) and 75th
(March 1991) observation.
Figure 1. Equal Weighted Indices
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Figure 2. Value Weighted Indices
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Descriptive statistics in Table 2 shows that value weighted indices have lower
volatility than equal weighted indices indicating that the smaller capitalised
stocks are more volatile, and also A indices have lower volatility. All of the
indices have positive skewness during full sample period. ADF and PP Unit
root tests, reported in Table 3, suggest nonstationarity for all of the price
indices; we can perform cointegration tests on the indices.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics(EW: Equally Weighted; VW: Value Weighted)
Item EWA index EWB index VWA index VWB index
Mean 113.8867 115.1453 110.4417 103.6505
Median 106.4746 96.74705 109.8023 97.73975
Maximum 201.6682 368.579 187.9837 264.8024
Minimum 4.3308 29.3476 50.6033 34.448
Std. Dev. 29.15287 65.76468 25.90454 42.8546
Skewness 0.626471 1.206933 0.253819 0.807526
Kurtosis 3.11473 4.502971 3.329231 4.07038
Jarque-Bera 8.178966 41.77597 1.891462 19.39622
Number of observations 124 124 124 124
Table 3
Results of Unit root tests
ADF PP
Level First Difference Level First Difference
EW A Index -1.32253 -10.8731*** -1.20715 -10.9945***
EW B Index -1.98978 -8.76536*** -1.72687 -8.5446***
VW A Index -2.39884 -9.70088*** -1.91366 -10.0178***
VW B Index -2.48613 -8.91876*** -2.16172 -8.7166***
Note: ** represents significant at 5% level, *** represents significant at 1% level.
Critical values are given by MacKinnon (1996).
5 Empirical results
5.1 Standard Cointegration test
We perform standard cointegration tests using both residual based cointegra-
tion test results and the Johansen procedure. None of these tests are significant
in rejecting the null of no cointegration (see Table 4). The results are just a
confirmation of what we observed in figures ?? and ??. This suggests that
our assumptions that lead to the existence of cointegration are not consistent
with the data we are using. In other words, the Chinese market is segmented
such that different expectations and discount rates are driving the indices on
different time paths or that the market prices are not consistent with the fun-
damental value and driven by behavioural factors which differ across markets.
5.2 Residual based Cointegration test with structural break
We now consider the possibility of structural breaks within the full sample
period. We have already identified two possible dates and the potential forces
which are driving them. One of the major changes would be 28th of February
2001, when the Chinese government allowed domestic investors to trade on
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Table 4
Standard cointegration test results
Panel A Residual based test
Deterministic trend ADF PP
Intercept -0.98555 -1.08813
Equal weighted Intercept and trend -1.63386 -1.72839
None -0.99218 -1.09478
Intercept -1.59285 -1.59285
Value weighted Intercept and trend -1.92238 -1.92238
None -1.60023 -1.60023
Panel B Johansen test
Number of CE Max-eigenvalue Trace statistics
Equal weighted None 5.988237 9.161201
At most 1 3.172964 3.172964
Value weighted None 4.847163 7.861862
At most 1 3.014699 3.014699
Note: Critical values for residual based cointegration test are nonstandard critical
values for ADF and PP tests.
the B share market. The second significant event over our data period was the
Asian financial crisis in 1997 especially impacting, we would expect, on the B
share market.
Technically, if structural changes are ignored when they are indeed present,
the standard cointegration tests are biased. To consider this potential problem
of standard cointegration analysis, we first look at Gregory and Hansen test
with possible one break in the cointegrating relation. Test results are presented
in Table 5 and in the Figures 3 and 4 2 .
Table 5
Gregory and Hansen test results for full sample
EW Indices VW Indices
Model type Test statistics Break date Test statistics Break date
CC -2.6261 2000.12 -3.31988 2001.07
ADF CT -4.39566 2000.11 -4.40506 2000.11
CS -2.8638 2000.12 -3.3126 2000.11
CC -12.6031 2000.12 -17.6733 2001.06
Za CT -32.7209 2000.12 -34.9486 2000.12
CS -14.8444 2000.12 -18.606 2001.06
CC -2.67211 2000.12 -3.07708 2001.06
Zt CT -4.2783 2000.12 -4.39286 2000.12
CS -2.88845 2000.12 -3.19886 2001.06
Note: we obtain critical values from Gregory and Hansen (1996) Table 1. For sig-
nificant level 1%, we give a ***, level 5% with ** and 10% a *.
2 Only Zα statistics are plotted in these figures for equal weighted indices and value
weighted indices. The ADF and Zt test statistics have similar patterns which are
available upon request.
13
None of the tests reported in Table 5 provide significant evidence in favour of
a cointegrating relation. The reason for this situation might be explained by
the graphs. In each and every case, we observe two local minimums instead of
one, which suggest that we should look at estimating for more than one break.
Figure 3. Za statistics for the model of CC, CT and CS: Equal weighted
indices
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Figure 4. Za statistics for the model of CC, CT and CS: Value weighted
indices
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5.3 Test on Multiple breaks
Gregory and Hansen tests provide the possibility of identifying one break only
in the whole sample period, however, there are potential cases of more than
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one break. We now exploit this situation using Bai and Perron (1998, 2003)
(BP thereafter). In BP, they consider a linear regression and identify date and
number of breaks using two criteria: SSR (Sum of Squared Residuals) and
Information criteria. As mentioned in BP, these criteria are consistent even
the series are nonstationary. BP’s model allow us to consider partial structural
break as well as full structural break. We consider only mean shifts in a linear
regression between A and B indices, where we allow maximum 5 breaks and
consider a standard trimming value of 0.15. Using information criteria (see BP
for details), we conclude that two breaks are preferred. We observe the break
dates to be at the start of 1998 and 2001 for both equal and value weighted
indices, see Table 6 and Table 7.
Table 6
Multiple breaks test for Equal weighted indices
No. of Breaks SSR Break point BIC LWZ
0 31.40099 N/A -1.3734 -1.3653
1 11.4016 2001.02 -2.3088 -2.2309
2 3.2497 1998.01 -3.4862 -3.3383*
2001.02
1998.01
3 2.9899 2001.02 -3.4918 -3.2735
2003.09
1996.06
1998.03
4 2.6848 2001.02 -3.5217 -3.2328
2003.09
1996.06
1998.02
5 2.4706 1999.08 -3.5271* -3.1672
2001.02
2003.09
Note: Optimum SSR selected on information criteria are shown with a *; LWZ is
the modified BIC criteria, see Bai and Perron (1998) for detailed explanation
5.4 Sub-sample evaluation
We now proceed to consider sub-sample properties based on the methodology
of Gregory and Hansen (1996). Two sub-samples are considered: January 1995
to January 2001 and March 1998 to April 2005 with sample size of 73 and
86 respectively. The first one covers Asian financial crisis but excludes the
period following regulatory changes, and the second one excluding the crisis
but including policy innovation.
Since the sample size is relatively small, we do not use the asymptotic critical
values provided by Gregory and Hansen (1996). We calculate exact critical
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Table 7
Multiple breaks test for Value weighted indices
No. of Breaks SSR Break point BIC LWZ
0 19.67168 N/A -1.8411 -1.833
1 8.9456 2001.02 -2.5514 -2.4735
2 3.2227 1998.03 -3.4946* -3.3466*
2001.02
1996.06
3 3.0031 1998.03 -3.4874 -3.2691
2001.02
1996.06
1998.03
4 2.9639 2001.02 -3.4228 -3.1339
2003.09
1996.06
1998.02
5 2.949 1999.08 -3.3501 -2.9902
2001.02
2003.09
Note: Optimum SSR selected on information criteria are shown with a *
values with a Monte Carlo simulation similar to the one they adopt based on
response surface to solve this problem. The results of our sub-sample tests
are presented in table 8. It is clear that for the second sub-sample, there is
consistent and significant evidence that the A and B share indices are cointe-
grated with one single break at February 2001. The break point is consistent
with the timing of the regulatory change. Further diagrammatic evidence to
support this conclusion is provided in the appendix. On the other hand, the
evidence from first sub-sample test is not that conclusive. Some test statistics
are not significant; some are only marginally be able to reject the null of no
cointegration against the alternative of cointegration with a single break.
5.5 Cointegration test with dummy variables
We now consider the identification of cointegration using dummy variable
to control for the break dates. This means that we do not have to split the
sample which gives us a larger sample size. We construct two dummy variables
D1 = I(n ≥ 39)
3 and D2 = I(n ≥ 74). Thus our dummies correspond to the
date of March 1998 and February 2001. It is worth to note that including
two dummy variables in the system might affect the distribution and critical
values in cointegration test. We construct exact critical values with Monte
Carlo simulation, where two dummy variables are considered. Table 9 provide
3 I(·) is the identification function which equals unity if the argument is true and
zero otherwise.
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Table 8
Gregory and Hansen test results for sub-samples
Panel A Sample I
EW Indices VW Indices
Model type Test statistics Break point Test statistics Break point
CC -4.83962* 1998:02 -4.27211 1998:01
ADF CT -4.74469 1998:02 -4.50921 1998:01
CS -5.72678* 1998:01 -4.97725 1998:03
CC -34.6539* 1998:01 -25.9374 1998:01
Za CT -34.0865 1998:01 -27.4172 1998:01
CS -40.5427** 1998:01 -32.3964 1998:01
CC -4.53622* 1998:01 -3.75177 1998:01
Zt CT -4.47239 1998:01 -3.90581 1998:01
CS -5.06478* 1998:01 -4.42923 1998:01
Panel B Sample II
EW Indices VW Indices
Model type Test statistics Break point Test statistics Break point
CC -5.42337** 2001:02 -6.27126*** 2001:02
ADF CT -6.36525*** 2001:02 -6.15276*** 2001:02
CS -7.06112*** 2001:02 -6.27633*** 2001:02
CC -43.3553** 2001:01 -48.1196*** 2001:02
Za CT -47.5665** 2001:02 -47.0772** 2001:02
CS -56.5921*** 2001:02 -53.2042*** 2001:02
CC -5.28933** 2001:01 -5.75882*** 2001:02
Zt CT -6.40302*** 2001:02 -5.91025*** 2001:02
CS -7.10722*** 2001:02 -6.27584*** 2001:02
Critical values are calculated through a simple Monte Carlo simulation with 10000
experiments. We identify a significance level of 1% with a ***, level 5% with ** and
10% with a *.
all test statistics. In all three situations considered we significantly reject the
null of no cointegration.
A further confirmation is made by the Johansen type test, where we include
the two dummy variables as exogenous regressors in the VAR. Both maxi-
mum eigenvalues and trace statistics are significantly reject the null or no
cointegration in favour of one cointegration relationship.
5.6 Equilibrium Correction Model (ECM) representation
In this subsection, we use the two-step cointegration analysis procedure pro-
posed by Engle and Granger (1987) to estimate an ECM equation for the A
and the B share index. Firstly we considered both A and B shares equation
and found that the A share index does not adjust to the equilibrium error.
Hence we treat the A share index as exogenous and enter it directly into the B
share index equation. This also implies that the cointegrating equation repre-
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Table 9
Residual based cointegration test with dummy variables
ADF statistics T1 T2 T3
Equal weighted -5.73817*** -5.90544*** -7.19458***
Value weighted -5.45765*** -5.45619*** -5.73564***
Note: 1. We perform cointegration test for three alternatives: T1 represents break
in the intercept without time trend, T2 represents break in the intercept with time
trend and T3 represents break in the intercept as well as cointegrating relationship.
Critical values are calculated with 50000 experiments for out sample size and dummy
variables.;
2. For T1, critical values are: -4.89 -4.27 -3.97 for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
For T2, critical values are: -5.25 -4.62 -4.30 or 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For
T3, critical values are: -5.59 -4.92 -4.58 for 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.;
3. The ADF statistics are performed to OLS residuals with only intercept considered.
Optimal lag order for the tests is selected with the help of BIC
Table 10
Johansen test with dummy variables as exogenous variables
Number of CE Max-eigenvalue Trace statistics
Equal weighted None 29.29809*** 30.12533***
At most 1 0.827233 0.827233
Value weighted None 34.60031*** 38.07972***
At most 1 3.479413 3.479413
Note: For significant level 1%, we give a ***, level 5% with ** and 10% a *. For
Johansen test, we consider a structural break in constant only for T1 (Breaks in
the intercept without trend), which means there are two intercept shift at associated
break points.
sents the determination of the B share index. Equations 18 and 19 present the
results for the ECM for the equal weighted B share index, whereas Equations
20 and 21 present results for the value weighted B share index. Note that
the ECM term contains two dummy variables defined in subsection 4.5 and
we consider a shift in intercept only. In specifying the ECM we include two
dummy variables to reflect unusually large positive and negative movements
in returns. In the estimated equations, numbers in parentheses below coeffi-
cient values are t-statistics. The diagnostic tests include the normality test is
Jacque-Berra, the serial correlation is the F-test with two lags, the ARCH test
is an LM type test with one lag and finally the heteroscedasticity test is an
F-test. The p-values for each test are shown in the brackets.
ECMt = yt + 0.88 + 0.69dum1− 1.16dum2− 1.16xt (18)
∆yt = 0.76∆xt+ 0.14∆yt−1− 0.18ECMt−1+ 0.28dum3+ 0.25dum4
(8.26) (2.25) (−3.91) (4.75) (5.75)
(19)
Diagnostic tests: R-squared 0.58; Adjusted R-squared 0.57; AIC = -2.0588;
SBIC = -1.9439 Normality = 4.96 (0.084); Serial correlation = 1.05 (0.36);
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ARCH = 0.86(0.36); Hetero = 1.49 (0.17)
ECMt = yt − 0.64 + 0.57dum1− 0.89dum2− 0.84xt (20)
∆yt = 0.33∆xt+ 0.14∆yt−1− 0.27ECMt−1+ 0.30dum3− 0.25dum4
(3.32) (2.70) (−4.25) (10.97) (−16.42)
(21)
Diagnostic tests: R-squared 0.67; Adjusted R-squared 0.66; AIC = -2.2291;
SBIC = -1.8827 Normality = 2.55 (0.28); Serial correlation = 0.33 (0.72);
ARCH = 0.62 (0.44); Hetero = 3.71 (0.00)
Considering first the long-run relationship, the notable issue is that the re-
sponse of the B share equal weighted index to changes in the equivalent A
share index is greater than unity. Hence the B share discount will fall in a
rising market and rise in a declining market. This observation suggests that in-
terpreting the effects of the 2001 policy change requires knowledge of the state
of the market. It has been suggested that the discount reduced significantly
after the regulatory change but has since moved back to levels associated with
pre-2001. During this period we have seen a falling stock market which is con-
sistent with the discount increasing. Thus the initial effects of the regulatory
change are outweighed by the short run effects of a falling stock market. Note
also the opposite effect for the value weighted index. The impact for the equal
weighted index must be driven by low capitalisation stocks firms as observed
Karolyi and Li (2003) who also observed that discounts seem to fall most for
momentum stocks, also consistent with the response of greater than unity on
the short run change in A shares when we use the equal weighted index. We
may also note that the impact of the dummy variables for the two structural
breaks are consistent with our interpretation of these events.
In the ECM models reported above we have included more dummy variables to
account for potential outlier observations. This relates particularly to the dates
around the change in regulation and also times when stock index changes are
unusually large (mainly associated with the Asian Crisis period). The dates
corresponding to the dummies reported are: dum3 (February and March 2001),
dum4 (December 1996, May 1999, May 2000, May 2001), dum5 (April 1997,
May and June 1999, December 2000, March and May 2001), dum6 (January,
March and July 1998, July 1999).
If we consider each of the equations above we obtain further insight into the
behaviour of A and B share markets. For the equal-weighted index we observe
that the speed of adjustment to the equilibrium error is rather low at 0.18,
although since we are looking at monthly data it suggests around 6 months
for the B index to adjust to its long-run value. Looking at the value weighted
index we can see a faster speed of adjustment with less than 4 months being the
duration of adjustment. The interest in this comparison is that it suggests that
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low capitalized stocks adjust more slowly and these have a disproportionate
effect on the equal weighted index.
6 Discussions and Conclusion
6.1 Discussion of the results
We have presented a series of results which indicate that, despite the exis-
tence of significant price differences across A and B shares, when we take into
consideration the influence of structural changes, the share markets appear to
move together. The long-run relationship identifies the B share discount and
that it is related to the share indices in a predictable manner. We now consider
the implications of this result for understanding the cause of the discount.
First we note that there are specific events which are associated with the
structural breaks. Using the results of section 4.6 we may observe that the
Asian Financial Crisis has positive effects on the B share discount. This is
consistent with both of our explanations for the B share discount. The impact
of the financial crisis will have been to increase the risk premium international
investors required in order to hold Chinese shares. The effect of the regulatory
change is negative for the discount. This would suggest that the effect of
allowing Chinese residents to trade B shares was to reduce the risk premium
that was applied and hence the price of B shares moved towards those of the
A shares. Note that the effects of the latter change are much larger than for
the value weighted index which is consistent with the observation that the
adjustment fell mainly on small firms’ stock (see Chen et al. (2001)). Secondly
we may note the moderate speed of adjustment of the discount to its long-run
equilibrium value which suggests that it takes a relatively long time for the
discount to return to its equilibrium value.
The role of the Asian financial crisis is consistent with increases in the discount
rate as international investors increase the risk premium and revise downwards
forecasts of future dividend growth. Note that both A and B shares are affected
by the crisis in a downward direction. However for the A shares the effects were
much less persistent which makes it difficult to explain the response of Chinese
investors to adjustment of fundamental dividend flows if we also suppose that
B share markets were driven by fundamentals. Short run increase in the risk
premium seems to be the reason for the A share adjustment. Beyond the Asian
crisis the indices move together (and hence the B share discount is relatively
stable) and the B share equal weighted index has returned to its pre-crisis
level. The fundamental explanation for this must be based on the reduction
in risk premium and expected dividend growth. Once Chinese investors are
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allowed into the B market we observe a very significant spike in the B share
index. However this does not completely remove the B share discount and
over the remaining period the B share index is declining against the A share
index in a falling market. From a fundamental perspective we may observe
that introducing Chinese investors into the A share market will generate a
lower risk premium if they judge the risks to be lower or they have lower
risk aversion (as in Eun et al. (2001)). However a puzzle is the increase in
the discount after the initial adjustment to the policy change. As we have
discussed above some authors have argued that this implies an explanation
more firmly founded in the behavioural finance tradition.
The noise trader model we introduced in section 2 provided this sort of foun-
dation. We showed there that changes in a number of behavioural factors could
be used to explain why the cointegrating relationship would change. We may
infer that the structural break in the relationship around the time of the Asian
Financial Crisis is driven by such factors as a relative (B to A market) decline
in noise trader sentiment (as measured by the δ∗A, δ
∗
B ), by an increase in rela-
tive risk (σ2A,σ
2
B), by a relative increase (decrease) in pessimistic (optimistic)
noise traders. It seems unlikely that the regulatory change would influence
expectations of noise traders but it is reasonable to conclude that the A share
market is priced more highly because the noise trader sentiment is more pos-
itive than in the B market. Hence an increase in optimistic noise trader will
reduce the discount (smart traders might expect an increase in B share prices
and hence buy into the market as well). The fact that the discount adjusts
back may well reflect the decline in sentiment post-2001 and a reduction in
the number of noise traders operating in the B share market and consequent
downward price adjustment.
6.2 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed the relationship between Shanghai Stock Exchange A and
B share price indices in this paper. Extending from a standard cointegration
framework, we allow for structural breaks during the full sample period. In
our full sample period, two major events happened: the Asian financial crisis
and opening up of the B share market to domestic investors. They are roughly
consistent with the results we obtain from our formal testing of break dates.
After dating the break points, we conduct a standard cointegration test with
two dummy variables, using Monte Carlo simulation to find exact critical value
for our test. All tests conducted suggest the existence of a long run relationship
between A and B share indices when we allow for two breaks.
We provide two competing explanations for our results, one based on the
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Rational Valuation Formula the other using ideas from Behavioural Finance.
However we are unable to evaluate fully which of these explanations is more
appropriate. Investigation at the level of the individual share prices may throw
more light on the issue.
However, as it stands we have been able to identify that the B-share discount is
to some extent predictable and to provide evidence that it changes in response
to specific shocks. We have also identified that the discount is dependent on
whether the A market is rising or falling.
Appendix: list of selected stocks
Table .1
List of selected stocks
Name of the stock A share Code B share Code
Auto instrument 600848 900928
Baosight software 600845 900926
China Textile 600610 900906
Chlor-Alkali chemical 600618 900908
Dajiang 600695 900919
Daying 600844 900921
Dazhong Transportation 600611 900903
Erfangji 600604 900902
First pencil 600612 900905
Friendship 600827 900923
Haixin 600851 900917
Highly 600619 900910
Huaxin Cement 600801 900933
Jinjiang Investment 600650 900914
Jinqiao 600639 900911
Lianhua fibre 600617 900913
Lujiazui 600663 900932
Material Trading centre 600822 900927
Phoenix 600679 900916
SH. Sanmao 600689 900922
Sanjiu Development 600614 900907
Shanggong 600643 900924
Shanghai Diesel 600641 900920
SH Electric applicances 600835 900925
Shanghai forever 600618 900915
SH. Posts Telecoms 600680 900930
SVA electron 600602 900938
Tyre Rubber 600623 900909
Wingsung Data 600613 900904
Yaohua Pilkington Glass 600819 900918
Data source: Taiwan Economic Journal Asia Emerging Market Data Base.
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